One could say that we are human beings to the degree to which our conscience is developed. My paper analyses the conscience from an ethical point of view and states that it is to be understood as the measure of morality within a person. [‘Moral’ refers to a sense of right and wrong, and ethics to the principles of “good” and “bad” agreed by a society]. Taking into consideration that there are people who feel an acute sense of guilt when (...) committing a crime and others who feel nothing, my work tries to identify the factors responsible for such a state of affairs. Therefore, it deals with the question, “Why are there considerable differences among people from the point of view of morality?”. I shall elaborate mainly on the role of education and genetic heritage, which are instrumental in the development of moral conscience within a person. Their influence in shaping it is ensured by the activity of the neurons and of other processes within the brain, which firstly produce the human consciousness. Other elements ‘grow’ on it. (shrink)

Paul Tillich believes that the sacred and human history undergo a parallel development, which is ‘punctuated’ from time to time by the ‘breaking’ of the former within the latter during moments of special significance, kairoi; these become “centers” of human history. Such a ‘center’ must not be comprehended either in terms of quantity, or as a midpoint between past and future, or as a particular moment, but as something that makes coherent the manifestation of the Kingdom of God within the (...) human collective existence. One of the understanding the German Theologian has concerning human history is that it is a succession of such ‘centers’. This is an ‘evolutionary’ view within the history of ideas, and a topic I dealt with in my work. (shrink)

Against much of the philosophical tradition, Spinoza and Nietzsche defend an understanding of freedom opposed to free will and formulated as an ethical ideal consisting in a transition from a smaller to a greater power of acting. Starting from a shared commitment to necessity and radical immanence, they present freedom as a passage to a greater power of self-determination and self-expression of the body. Nevertheless, the continuities between their power ontologies and their respective commitments to a life of knowledge break (...) down in their discussion of the various possible manifestations of power. I will argue that Nietzsche's distinctive formulation of power as struggle between wills to power enables him to formulate the question of the qualitative dimension of empowerment in a way that is foreign to Spinoza's rational determinism. While acknowledging the profound similarities, I will argue that we must see Nietzsche's discussion of affirmation as the culmination of his disagreement with his predecessor on the topic of freedom and empowerment. (shrink)

We formulate a general institution-independent (i.e. independent of the details of the actual logic formalised as institution) version of the Craig Interpolation Theorem and prove it in dependence of Birkhoff-style axiomatizability properties of the actual logic.We formalise Birkhoff-style axiomatizability within the general abstract model theoretic framework of institution theory by the novel concept of Birkhoff institution.

ABSTRACT What is the best way to confront the thought of eternal recurrence—the thought that we would have to live our life “once again and innumerable times again”—this great, heavy burden that, as Nietzsche warns, may crush us? In this article, I argue that learning to love oneself plays a privileged role in preparing us for facing this abysmal thought. Self-love consists in the cultivation of self-knowledge and in an engagement with the past that enables us to give it new (...) meaning and significance. Furthermore, Nietzsche’s revaluation of self-love in Thus Spoke Zarathustra brings with it a rethinking of our relations to others. To love oneself implies care for the empowerment and growth of others, as well as the capacity for self-sacrifice. (shrink)

The main novelty my article brings concerns a particular iconographic motif: that known as the ‘trial by the water of reproach’. In the few cases where this is rendered, usually only Mary is presented as undergoing this test, but in Cappadocian art Joseph is also subjected to it. Additionally, to this visual topic, another one that is rarely depicted will be introduced and commented upon: that known as ‘Christ’s first bath’. I will provide a particular example: the fresco which constitutes (...) part of the decoration that embellishes the walls of Karabaş Kilise/ ‘The Big Church’ in Soğanlı Valley, southern Cappadocia. A few images – one of them never published before – have been included within this publication. (shrink)

I shall argue here that Trinity is a leitmotiv in Marion’s works and that his latest analysis on said concept can enlighten us on the function of the icon and on the structure of his phenomenology of givenness. As such I will argue for a Trinitarian character of givenness. To prove this, I shall structure this paper as a commentary on Givenness and Revelation that will show how this book reveals unclear functions of the Trinity involved in givenness, such as (...) the role of the Holy Spirit, and relate these functions to the strict phenomenological structure of the act of giving. I shall first set the stage for a phenomenological interpretation of Trinity, showing which concepts are at play in Marion’s analysis of revelation. This will be followed by the integration of Trinity in the immanent field of phenomenology. Further, I shall show how revelation serves as the model for a new phenomenal logic, and I shall try to explain its manifestation. This will be followed by a presentation of how Marion’s new considerations on the topic of revelation can clarify both the role of the given and in addition the role of the subject within Marion’s phenomenology of givenness. (shrink)

I will begin with the end. Marcel Hénaff's sudden death in June 2018 opened a space of silence and surely did not prepare me to speak or write publicly about his passing. In his unexpected death, as a friend, Marcel left me with a problem. His death is now my problem. Yet, death is not a persistent question in Marcel Hénaff's thinking. At the very least, I will start by positing here that in his last book, Violence dans la raison? (...) Conflit et cruauté, both death and cruelty are enigmas.I will now attempt to elucidate the relationship between these two concepts by articulating two enigmas of death.First enigma: We usually say that in death, one deserves to eternally rest in peace.1 This claim is not totally... (shrink)

What are Descartes’s views on the body and how do they change? In this article, I try to make clearer the nature of the shift towards an increased focus on the body as ‘my’ body in Descartes’s Passions of the Soul. The interest in the nature of passions, considered from the point of view of the ‘natural scientist’, is indicative of a new approach to the study of the human. Moving beyond the infamous mind-body union, grounded in his dualist metaphysics, (...) Descartes begins developing a philosophical anthropology centred on the notion of power and better suited to practical philosophy. (shrink)

Graham Harman’s Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) emphasizes the autonomy of objects, positing a withdrawn surplus of being that resists reduction to its parts or the sum of its parts. However, Harman’s framework faces conceptual tensions, including challenges in reconciling epistemological and ontological dimensions, explaining the formation of compound objects, and ascribing determinate features to experientially inaccessible objects. I argue that these issues arise mostly due to Harman’s over-commitment to a withdrawn substantial core of objects. To address these issues, I propose turning (...) to Jean-Luc Nancy’s post-phenomenological materialism and Alain Badiou’s mathematical realism. Both Nancy and Badiou offer alternatives to Harman’s substantialist core, emphasizing a local, contextually bound identity of things, which describes a restricted domain from the endlessly broader horizon of relations and situations in which each thing is or can be involved. They thus account for the surplus of being in each thing and consequently their ontological autonomy without recourse to a substantive grounding. I argue such a relational-friendly account of pluralism avoids the conceptual issues Harman’s OOO runs into. Lastly, I emphasize the value of OOO as an advocate for ontological equality that seeks to avoid the emergence of privileged actors or centralized discourse. This dialogue between Harman, Nancy, and Badiou thus seeks to advance the possibility of pluralistic ontologies within relational frameworks, combining the perspectives of OOO with post-phenomenological theories to explore the complexities of relationality without recourse to non-relational substrata. (shrink)

I show that Kant’s depiction of the christic figure in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason is not contingent but explains how this figure functions in two essential ways: as a representation of a maximum of morality that can ground our moral disposition and in so doing acts as a stan­dard for morality. More precisely, the following argument is made: 1) the sublime nature of the image of Christ — as an image of universal respect for the law — (...) awakens the moral feeling of subjects in the sense of the possibility of overcoming one’s perverted nature; 2) as moral perfection it provides immediate transparency to the end goal of morality; 3) just as in the case of associative construction of empirical concepts, the sublime provides the prototype for association through which empirical acts are determined as moral ones; 4) the image of Christ also acts as motivator by encompassing said trans­parency and standard in the idea of moral perfection. These four points show that the image of Christ functions in a dual manner. Points 1) to 3) address Christ as a prototype/archetype (Urbild) — awakening and making possible a moral redefinition of the subject — while point 4) addresses Christ as an example (Vorbild) — sustaining and entertaining the moral redefinition as a motivating model. (shrink)

Wittgenstein talks in his Philosophical Investigations of a pupil engaging in a repetitive series continuation who suddenly begins to apply a different rule than the one instructed to him. This hypothetical example has been interpreted by a number of philosophers to indicate either a skeptical attitude towards rules and their application, an implicit need of knowledge and understanding of a rule accessible to those engaged in a given practice, or a certain normativity that guides our actions but is not cognitive, (...) but processual in nature. I wish to support and extend Ginsborg’s account of primitive normativity from a novel perspective in a twofold manner: 1) by describing the mechanism of primitive normativity via Kant’s concept of aesthetical and epistemic pleasure and displeasure; 2) by applying the conceptual pair of expected and unexpected uncertainty from adaptive learning theories, which describe the fluctuation of learning rates under uncertain circumstances.I am grateful to Dr. Romain Ligneul's help in better understanding the subtleties of this conceptual pair. (shrink)

Articles on the understanding of philosophy with special reference to Islamic teachings; includes theories of noted philosophers.

1. Sŏron -- 2. Ŭisik ŭi chonggyojŏk ch'ŭngmyŏn -- 3. Yŏng : Chŏng Yag-yong ŭi simnon -- 4. Yŏngch'e : Chŏng Yag-yong ŭi insŏngnon -- 5. 'Yŏngch'e' insŏngnon esŏ pon ch'ŏnin kwan'gye -- 6. Kyŏllon.